Mapping Strategic Communication in the EU

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In this Insight Edition we analyse the European Union’s approach to strategic communication, how it is shifting from fragmented, reactive messaging to building structured capabilities that treat communication as a strategic asset and a pillar of democratic resilience.

Why has the EU started caring about strategic communication? 

The European Union finds itself navigating a political landscape shaped as much by information as by institutions. War, foreign interference, democratic backsliding, AI-generated disinformation and the erosion of public trust have forced a shift. The EU should not just respond to threats, but try to anticipate them. 

What is emerging is more than a communication upgrade. Strategic communication is being reframed as a security capability, a resilience tool, and a political necessity. 

But what does that actually look like? The EEAS FIMI Threat Reports lays out a shared language for identifying manipulation. The European Democracy Shield sets out to equip civil society with tools to counter disinformation. Readiness 2030 brings communication into defence capability planning. The ProtectEU Strategy treats communication as public preparedness.  

Together, they map a strategic turn: a recognition that if the EU wants to protect what it stands for and it has to tell the story first. 

Building the Foundations: From FIMI Threats to Policy Integration 

In 2015, amid rising concerns over Russian disinformation campaigns in Eastern Europe, the East StratCom Task Force was created inside the European External Action Service (EEAS). This unit had a focus on debunking Kremlin narratives and promoting factual reporting about the EU. What began as reactive counter-messaging soon became a sign that communication could be used to shape the information space. 

Between 2020 and 2024, strategic communication spread across the EU. No longer confined to foreign affairs, it began to weave into digital policy, electoral integrity, platform accountability and public health. This was the phase of institutional layering: StratComm capacity inside DG HOME, DG COMM, DG JUST was developed; the Rapid Alert System (a secure network established to facilitate swift information-sharing and coordination between EU institutions and Member States on disinformation threats, particularly during elections and crises) was created; and stronger ties were built with fact-checkers and civil society organisations, recognising their frontline role in identifying, analysing and responding to disinformation across the Union; stronger ties with fact-checkers and civil society, recognising their frontline role in identifying, analysing and responding to disinformation across the Union. The threats were diversifying, so the response had to as well. 

The next step came in 2024 to 2025. This is where strategic communication moved from policy support to policy itself, as reflected in key policy documents such as the Readiness 2030 White Paper, the ProtectEU Strategy and the launch of the European Democracy Shield. In the aftermath of the Ukraine war, the Hamas–Israel conflict and AI’s mainstream manipulation, the EU began treating communication as part of its security, defence and preparedness infrastructure. 

Now, strategic communication is not only a response tool. It is being treated as a capability with its own objectives, architecture and risks and efforts to coordinate across the EU spectrum are being made. The risk, in fact, is that the more actors build their capacity autonomously, the less consistency there is among interventions. 

The EU's Strategic Communication Policy Mapping

The EU is moving from fragmented communication efforts to a more deliberate, structured approach. Especially during the second mandate of Von der Leyen, strategic communication is being embedded into democracy support, security policy and defence planning.  

1. EEAS FIMI Threat Reports – Mapping the Adversary 

The EEAS FIMI Threat Reports introduced the EU’s first common threat taxonomy for foreign information manipulation and interference. They moved the conversation from reactive debunking to systematic behavioural analysis. Instead of asking “is this fake news?”, the EU now asks “what narrative is being used, by whom, and why?”.

These reports, a collective effort by the EEAS Stratcomm Task Forces,  provide a shared analytical language and methodology for policymakers, national security agencies and stratcomm professionals across Member States. And they do something else: they train the system. By standardising incident classification, reporting methods and analysis frameworks, the FIMI reports build capacity by enabling Member States, especially those without large disinformation units, to develop or improve early warning systems, attribution capabilities, interagency coordination and structured incident reporting. 

The latest report reveals just how far this has come. Based on a dataset of over 750 verified FIMI incidents across 30 languages, it does not just map Russia and China’s narratives; it shows how those narratives evolve, how they adapt across platforms and how they link to broader geopolitical strategies. The reports are also complemented by the FIMI-ISAC (Information Sharing and Analysis Centre), which facilitates secure, real-time information exchange on foreign manipulation incidents between the EEAS and Member States, helping Member States build situational awareness and response. 

2. European Democracy Shield – Resilience Through Communication 

Disinformation does not just weaken trust; it also wears away democratic resilience. The European Democracy Shield, launched in 2024, is the EU’s planned framework to respond to this challenge and is set to replace and go beyond the European Democracy Action Plan. 

It is not a single program but a layered infrastructure for defending the information space: funding for fact-checkers, watchdogs, media literacy campaigns, digital resilience programs and civil society actors on the front lines of information integrity. Its logic is clear: democracy does not defend itself. 

The Shield will include a mix of financial instruments, technical support and strategic initiatives designed to strengthen public resilience, especially in the run-up to elections. What sets it apart is its strategic integration of communication, civic engagement and institutional reform. The Democracy Shield has the goal of ensuring that EU-level communication and counter-disinformation efforts are aligned with the work of local journalists, fact-checkers, educators and civil society organisations, so that messages resonate with citizens and can be applied effectively within local contexts. It recognises that countering disinformation is about restoring credibility, voice and shared values. 

At the heart of the Shield is a whole-of-society model: civil society organisations, journalists, educators and tech platforms are treated as strategic partners. This reflects a key shift: strategic communication is about defending trust from within. 

And unlike previous reactive efforts, the Shield is designed for anticipation. It provides targeted, forward-looking support during critical democratic moments, such as national and European elections and coordinates communication preparedness across EU institutions and Member States through shared monitoring systems, election-specific rapid alert mechanisms and joint guidance on countering disinformation during critical moments.

3. Readiness 2030 – Strategic Communication as a Defence Capability 

For the first time, the EU explicitly placed strategic communication within its defence capability framework, next to cyber defence, logistics and command and control. It is a signal that communication is a requirement in today’s security environment. 

At the core, Readiness 2030 introduced the idea of “narrative preparedness”. This is the ability to anticipate, coordinate, and project messages before, during and after a crisis. In this framing, messaging becomes deterrence, especially in hybrid threat environments. 

Readiness 2030 also makes an institutional shift. It formally inserts StratComm in EU defence and capability planning. Including: 

• Establish permanent narrative planning capacity within defence structures, 

• Integrate StratComm into operational exercises and simulations, 

• Develop a dedicated StratComm capability development roadmap, led by the EEAS and European Commission with Member States, similar to how the EU plans capabilities in cyber defence and logistics.

With this shift, strategic communication is no longer treated as a secondary or reactive tool. Instead, it is now considered a core element of defence, at least at the policy level. 

4. ProtectEU Strategy – Public Trust in Security Communication 

When threats escalate, so does the need for timely, credible, and coordinated messaging. The ProtectEU Strategy, the new Internal Security strategy adopted in early 2025, recognises this reality and elevates strategic communication as a key component of internal security preparedness. 

At the core of ProtectEU is the idea that trust is a key component of the security infrastructure. When communication fails, through delay, contradiction, or lack of clarity, public confidence crumbles, disinformation flourishes and operational response suffers.  

ProtectEU brings StratComm into internal security planning. It proposes stronger coordination between services like DG HOME, DG ECHO, and the EEAS by establishing shared guidelines for crisis communication, aligning monitoring and alert systems for misinformation during emergencies and planning joint communication exercises with Member States. It is about readiness, not just in supply chains and border management, but in public narratives. 

The ProtectEU Strategy reframes strategic communication as public safety infrastructure. It recognises that in the first moments of a crisis, words matter as much as actions. Trust in alerts, in institutional spokespeople and in coordinated action can determine not only whether misinformation spreads, but whether lives are protected. 

In doing so, ProtectEU closes the loop between internal security and narrative stability. It operationalises communication as a protective layer, not a public relations afterthought. 

Towards a Coherent EU Voice 

Strategic communication at the EU level is being mainstreamed across democratic resilience, internal security, foreign policy and now defence. The EU is slowly but decisively acknowledging that communication is a strategic asset. 

This mainstreaming marks a major shift, showing that strategic communication is no longer something you do after policy is made. This approach implies that strategic communication ought to be part of how policy is designed, implemented and defended.  

For all its growing relevance, StratComm still lacks a centre of gravity. There is no single EU doctrine, no central coordinating structure and no dedicated budget line – instead budget is spread across services. There is no fully operational rapid response mechanism with real-time agility, resources and authority to react to coordinated narrative attacks or information crises, leaving the EU vulnerable in the first hours of a hybrid incident, despite the existence of tools like the Rapid Alert System for information sharing. 

In February 2025, the European Commission created a Task Force on Information Manipulation within DG COMM, tasked with protecting EU policies against manipulation and coordinating responses across the Commission. While this marks a step toward greater internal alignment, it remains unclear how the Task Force will coordinate efforts across EU institutions and Member States or how it will manage overlaps with existing frameworks like the EEAS’s FIMI system, particularly in distinguishing between foreign and domestic manipulation. 

The risk is not just bureaucratic inefficiency. It is strategic incoherence. 

Without a clear doctrine and chain of command, the EU struggles to speak with one voice during crises. Messages become delayed, contradictory or overly technocratic. That creates openings for adversarial narratives and fuels public confusion or distrust. 

This fragmentation also undermines the EU’s ability to project influence externally. A strategic communication system that cannot coordinate internally cannot be expected to shape global narratives, support partners or counter disinformation abroad. The result is a paradox: the EU is investing more in StratComm than ever, but without a system to guide it, it is not getting the full benefit from these efforts.

Strategic Implications 

Strategic communication in the EU is no longer just a support function. It has become a strategic asset that shapes perception, builds trust and deters adversaries. But if the EU wants to move from communication to influence, it needs structure and purpose. What is missing is cohesion. To operationalise strategic communication as a true capability, the EU must address four core priorities: 

• Coordinate across institutions and member states 

• Build narrative capabilities 

• Develop a coherent doctrine and long-term vision 

• Invest in personnel, infrastructure and rapid tools 

Conclusion 

Over the past decade, strategic communication has moved from the margins of foreign policy into the centre of European security, democracy and defence. The tools now exist, however the architecture is still lacking. 

What is missing is coherence. A unifying doctrine. A dedicated operational hub.  

That means: 

• Embedding it in defence and crisis protocols. 

• Resourcing it like a critical infrastructure. 

• Framing it not as messaging, but as influence, deterrence, and democratic resilience.