The Hague Summit and the Future of NATO’s Deterrence Strategy

Welcome to The StratComm Insights! 

In this Insight Edition we explore the difference between NATO’s 2024 and 2025 Summits and how The Hague marked a turning point in the Alliance’s approach to deterrence. We analyse what changed, why it matters and what must happen next for these commitments to become credible defense capabilities.

From Washington to The Hague: A Shift in Priorities 

NATO has long defined itself as the world’s leading military alliance for deterrence and defence. Yet, with the rise of AI-driven disinformation, cyber sabotage and foreign influence operations, the threat landscape has changed fundamentally.  At the 2025 Hague Summit, under U.S. President Donald Trump’s renewed tenure and with new NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte, NATO concentrated on building the financial and capability base needed to keep collective defence viable and beginning the shift of that burden from Washington to European allies. The agenda was deliberately narrow, designed to maintain cohesion and to set the foundation for the Alliance’s next decade of resilience and capability-building. 

This contrasts markedly with the 2024 Washington Summit. The 75th anniversary in Washington produced a sprawling 44-paragraph communiqué, saturated with reaffirmations of values: democratic resilience, the rule of law, and support for Ukraine’s future. Hybrid threats were acknowledged, but mainly via broad references to resilience and “emerging challenges”. The tone was inclusive and commemorative, fit for celebration. 

In The Hague, the language and priorities sharpened. The 2025 declaration was concise—merely five paragraphs—with a pragmatic, security-first focus. Gone were the elaborate rhetorical flourishes; in their place, strong emphasis on three priorities: deterring Russia, reaffirming the bond between the US and Europe, and making a bold pledge to increase defence spending to 5% of national GDP by 2035. Ukraine, so prominent in Washington, was less central in The Hague, reflecting both the new US administration’s approach and a wider European recognition that credible readiness must now trump political promises.

The 5% Defence Investment Pledge 

The Hague commitment to spend 5% of GDP on defence by 2035 is a bold move, far surpassing NATO’s previous 2% benchmark. This was designed to signal determination and to reassure the US—especially under President Trump—that European allies are willing to shoulder more of the burden. The implications, however, are significant: for European NATO members, collective military spending would need to rise from an estimated €325 billion in 2024 to over €900 billion by 2035. This will require major restructuring of national budgets, relaxed fiscal rules, and, in most cases, increased reliance on debt. 

The European Commission’s SAFE (Support to Armed Forces in Europe) programme is already responding, with €150 billion in loans to support increased defence-related investment—reflecting the direction and pace of change. Nevertheless, there is a genuine risk that such a “defence spending tsunami” could overwhelm public finances and compromise the strategic clarity the investment seeks to achieve. 

And then there is public opinion. While support for defence investment is strong in countries like Poland, Denmark, and the UK, the picture is much more fractured elsewhere. In Italy, for example, only 17% of the population back increased military spending, according to a recent survey. Generational divides also run deep: older citizens tend to support mandatory military service; younger Europeans are far less convinced. A defence investment of this scale, carried out without public consensus or clear political messaging, could backfire, fuelling populist backlash or apathy, especially in a Europe that is still recovering from the economic scars of past crises. 

Strategic Communication: Asset or Afterthought?

While the Hague Summit reflected an increasing awareness of the need for “resilience” and devoted additional funding to “societal preparedness”, it is important to note that neither the official summit declaration nor its accompanying summary statements explicitly mention “strategic communication” by name. Instead, the language centres on broad concepts such as resilience, cognitive security, and the defence of society. Consequently, analysts and policy commentators interpret these provisions—especially the expansion of investment in innovation and civil preparedness—as aligning with a more expansive vision of deterrence that implicitly includes strategic communication.

However, it should be noted that, despite NATO possessing a formal doctrine for strategic communications and operating a dedicated StratCom Centre of Excellence in Riga, the summit declaration falls short of providing a formal political recognition that strategic communication is an integral part of defence and of the current understanding of deterrence. While strategic communication is acknowledged within NATO’s theoretical frameworks and specialist initiatives do exist, there remains a conspicuous absence of explicit, high-level affirmation in the Alliance’s political declarations. This lack of formal endorsement at summit level is particularly striking at a time when adversaries are escalating their investments in information warfare and cognitive operations. 

Furthermore, this limited recognition is compounded by a tangible reduction in NATO's commitment to public diplomacy. Recent reforms at NATO headquarters, including the dissolution of the Public Diplomacy Division and decreased central investment in communication functions, mark a significant step back in the Alliance’s ability to proactively shape narratives and engage with Allied societies and international audiences. This dual gap—political and structural—not only undermines the effective operationalisation of strategic communication, but also risks ceding narrative initiative to adversaries at a pivotal moment for transatlantic unity and resilience. 

Divergence: The EU and Member States Step Up

This step back by NATO contrasts sharply with current trends within the European Union and some of its Member States. The EU has been ramping up its efforts in strategic communication, increasingly treating it as an operational necessity. While still missing systematic coordination across the different threads, the EU is expanding specialist communication units, launching new initiatives, and pushing for more coherent, comprehensive communication strategies across EU institutions and delegations.

Some Member States, e.g. France, are also boosting dedicated strategic communication capabilities, integrating such roles more thoroughly within their foreign and security policy structures and advocating for robust, pan-European approaches to communication and hybrid resilience.

Implications for NATO StratComm and Deterrence

The combination of NATO scaling down its public diplomacy and the EU increasing its investments creates an institutional divergence likely to have strategic consequences. As the EU establishes strategic communication as a funded, central component of its external action, NATO risks relegating its own narrative capacity just as information warfare intensifies and practically relying on Allies’ efforts – which are far from consistent and are subject to different political winds. Effective deterrence today demands not only greater military funding, but also coordinated, proactive strategic communication across the Alliance and with key partners.

Conclusion

The Hague Summit signalled more than a response to shifting threats: it redefined what deterrence means in an age of systemic uncertainty. NATO, at least rhetorically, used to recognise societal resilience and the critical importance of the information domain; yet it risks undercutting itself by downgrading investment in the very tools needed to sustain narrative advantage. The EU, by contrast, is stepping into the vacuum, building genuine capacity in strategic communication – although it still misses military capacity and expertise. For NATO to maintain credibility for its new “deterrence narrative”, investment in public diplomacy and communication cannot be allowed to become an afterthought. Only real, operational capability can ensure that the Alliance is able to contest—and win—confrontations over both facts and force.